In Russia, against the backdrop of the ongoing war with Ukraine, the likelihood of a new wave of mobilization has once again become a topic of discussion in the public sphere. Sooner or later, it must happen, but the question remains about the scale of such a mobilization.
The failure of the campaign to recruit contract soldiers in various regions of Russia makes the prospect of another mobilization wave highly probable. The Russian authorities are trying to find ways to replenish their units on the front lines, and although they are recruiting some individuals, it is clearly not enough. Since the first wave of mobilization last fall, the state has realized the many gaps that exist in the legislation. Throughout this year, it has been evident that the Russian authorities are diligently preparing for a new phase of mobilization, striving to frantically streamline this process: the State Duma deputies have tightened a number of laws related to conscription and mobilization. Amendments are being introduced, electronic notices are being issued, fines for non-appearance at the military registration and enlistment office have increased significantly (from 500-3000 to 10-30 thousand rubles). Numerous measures of administrative responsibility for officials and legal entities have also been introduced: fines for non-fulfillment of the duty to ensure timely notification and appearance of citizens, for failure to provide lists of citizens subject to initial military registration, and others. In addition, conscripts are prohibited from leaving the country from the moment the notice appears in the register, rather than after seven days, as it was before. Promises that only professional military contractors would participate in the "special operation" have long been forgotten. The personnel army died a long time ago. Therefore, mobilized individuals and conscripts are being sent to the front. From the first day of compulsory service, you can sign a contract, and if you are already under the authority of your commander, he can press you in various ways to sign that contract.
Throughout 2023, the Russian authorities assured the public that there would be no new wave of mobilization in the country, but although it is difficult to predict the timing of this wave, the amendments adopted by the State Duma simplify the conscription process for the military registration and enlistment offices. The situation at hand suggests that the authorities intend to draw several million people into the army without directly announcing the start of a general mobilization.
In the autumn of 2022, Russia already declared a partial mobilization. The campaign quickly turned into chaos, with numerous complaints from the mobilized fresh units and their relatives about the quality of the issued weapons and equipment, the quality of their training, and the commanders. Approximately a month later, the mobilization officially ended, but in reality, it did not cease for a single day.
This is war, and war always requires resources, from start to finish. The Russian authorities have not defined quantitative and temporal measurements for the conduct of mobilization, particularly regarding the number of mobilized individuals and the duration of their stay in the combat zone. Considering the military losses that Russia is enduring in Ukraine, it will sooner or later have to announce a new mobilization. It may start abruptly, simply to try to close the gap that has emerged, essentially using "cannon fodder." As soon as the authorities decide that it's "time for you to defend the motherland," you are obliged to appear at the military registration and enlistment office, and if you fail to do so within a short period, all your basic rights are automatically annulled, without trial, investigation, or understanding of the reasons.
The authorities hoped to manage with the recruitment of contract soldiers, but it is not working out as they would like. They lured Russians to the military registration and enlistment office in every possible way: through social advertisements with "nostalgic motives," and when appealing to patriotism was futile, they used money and various bonuses. Propaganda offices for promoting contract service were set up all over the country, even advocating for the signing of military service contracts in children's institutions. The only motivation was money. The propaganda presented contract service as a "solution to all the problems" of impoverished Russians burdened with debts. But this motivation works well only in depressed regions where families live on the grandmother's pension or receive 10, 20, or 30 thousand rubles there. In such conditions, the promised 200 thousand rubles per person undoubtedly work.
Even in the Kremlin, categories of citizens who are easiest to "demobilize" without annoying the main part of society have been identified. Mortgages are very common in Russia, taken out for everything: purchases, repairs, apartments, cars, gifts. Accordingly, there are hundreds of thousands of mortgage debtors in Russia. That is, anyone who owes the bank will receive a summons. Everyone will go to war: those limitedly fit for service, students, doctors of science, pensioners. Yes, of course, the promised money looks very tempting, but the chance to get rich is quite illusory, and can the Russian leadership be trusted, having repeatedly demonstrated how it "abandons its own" and not only its own.
Russia's main problem is that human life is not considered a value and is not felt as such. Most likely, ahead of the presidential elections in March 2024, the authorities are unlikely to want to announce a large-scale mobilization in order to "not annoy or worry the voters" and to avoid significant social upheavals that could complicate these elections. In the run-up to the elections, the Kremlin will almost certainly seek to minimize unpopular political moves. It seems the authorities are afraid that the mobilization will fail, which could significantly damage their image: if the authorities cannot mobilize their citizens during the war, can such authority be trusted?
Russia has to continue mobilization covertly. The authorities urgently need to replenish the depleted army. However, over time, doing so becomes increasingly difficult. Russian citizens are promised money and a lot of benefits, while migrants are promised citizenship. According to the Russian leadership's plan, now even migrants should "happily" go to fight for the Russian world. Apparently, there are no long queues of patriots willing to die for the Motherland, despite the extensive list of material and social benefits. Therefore, active recruitment of migrant laborers for the war has begun. In the face of constantly increasing demand for "cannon fodder," it is very difficult for Russian Russia, Mobilization, War, Legislation, Military, Conflict, Society registration and enlistment offices to bypass such a large mobilization resource.
The Russian authorities are actively developing packages of "support measures," lists of "prohibitions," inventing all new ways and methods to drag people into the war. Increasing the size of the army during wartime always means an increase in the number of losses. Irreversible losses have already exceeded one hundred thousand people. The black package has become a return ticket home for a large number of Russians. We may never know the exact numbers of the dead. The real numbers can be much more dramatic. But who is counting them? The authorities are completely untouched by these numbers: the deceased will simply be replaced by a new batch of cannon fodder. And here everyone must decide what is better – evasion of mobilization or complicity in a crime from which one can never cleanse oneself, if, of course, one is lucky enough to survive.
Source: nieuwsimpuls.online
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