Hopes and realities.
Putin, as a person who at the beginning of his political career did not stand out with any special abilities or charisma and was generally a faceless individual, has changed so much that now none of the world leaders can either tame or appease him. What is the phenomenon behind this?
It would be correct to say that the Putin regime relies only on repression and propaganda, but it is not enough to understand the stability and "longevity" of Putin's political existence. He has been "ruling" Russia for 22 years now. Only Stalin ruled for longer in modern Russian history, with a reign of 26 years. What is the secret of this politician's "resilience"?
Undoubtedly, he has created a powerful punitive system, or rather, restored a system of repression, coercion, lies, and propaganda. However, dictatorship does not rely solely on coercion. What do ordinary people, citizens, see in Putin?
When it became clear that President Yeltsin was stepping down from office and people were asked, "What do you expect from the next president?", the first response was, "an exit from the crisis of the 1990s." People lacked a sense of stability and peace, and there was disappointment and anger that arose in response to unfulfilled hopes that Russia would become a normal country like others. The collapse of these hopes generated strong anger towards the democrats who promised but failed to provide a decent standard of living for the citizens. Many Russians believed that a better life was possible.
And it was this dissatisfaction towards those who did not meet these aspirations, and towards themselves for believing in them, that became the foundation of Putin's rise. In the midst of confusion and disillusionment, a new, unfamiliar, undefined, and unknown figure emerged. Various forces, from the patriotic cheerleaders, conservatives, and communists to the democrats, suddenly focused their expectations on him. As a result, Putin gained powerful support.
However, recognition and approval came almost immediately. If in 1999 less than 0.5% of Russian citizens (data from the Levada Center) knew about him, after the series of explosions in residential buildings, terrorist attacks, panic, and a sharp surge in fear that swept across Russia in the early 2000s, he presented himself as firm and decisive, at least in words, a leader from the ranks of "I know how it should be done." And after the famous Putin phrase, "We will hunt them down in the shithouse," there was a kind of "social convergence" with the population, recognition of him as "one of us."
During that period, the Russian economy was still recovering from the inertia of the 1997-1998 crisis, but all social indicators gradually started to improve. A certain conservative portion of Russians not only recognized Putin as "one of their own" but also believed that he was capable of ensuring a certain stability, order, and restoring people's self-respect. Subsequently, there was indeed an increase in people's incomes, the market economy started functioning, and this became the basis for trust in him. People believed that Putin could truly bring order and stability.
Another expectation from the future president was the restoration of Russia's status as a great power, i.e., regaining the same level of authority that the Soviet Union once held, restoring Russia's status as a superpower. And this could only be achieved through the demonstration of power. People saw in Putin a person capable of demonstrating strength, sometimes crossing into violence and coercion. In fact, it is historically ingrained that in Russia, people are accustomed to a firm form of governance, more inclined towards the "stick" rather than the "carrot."
People interpret Putin's readiness for violence in different ways: as determination, inflexibility, courage, knowledge of what needs to be done, and finally, the ability to lead people.
Furthermore, an interesting trend emerged - peaks of Putin's popularity always coincided with the use of military force.
At the beginning of the Second Chechen War, there was a thirst for revenge, a desire to overcome the humiliation of not being able to handle a small region like Chechnya and the inability to crush it ruthlessly. And this became the basis for the belief in Putin. Then came the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, which triumphantly ended in six days.
Starting around 2009, there was a steady decline in the level of approval for Putin's activities and his support. Putin's rating started to decline, and by the end of 2013, 47% of respondents stated that they did not want to see him as president for another term. Against the backdrop of mass protests related to the falsification of the presidential elections and the power transfer with Medvedev, his rating sharply dropped. Approximately 60% of respondents stated that they had lost faith and grew tired of waiting for Putin to fulfill his promises, especially amidst declining income levels for the population.
In 2014, the annexation of Crimea took place, accompanied by a patriotic-chauvinistic euphoria. The aggressive imperial policy and disregard for international norms under the slogan of protecting one's own sharply restored respect. The approval rating, which soared to 87%, held steady until 2016. However, after Putin signed the pension reform decree in 2018, his rating began to decline again.
The full-scale war in Ukraine brought him popularity once more, with the approval rating jumping to 83% and remaining at around 75% for six months after the start of the war. However, the announced mobilization abruptly changed the situation. A public opinion poll conducted shortly after the mobilization was announced recorded a ten-point decrease in support.
Perhaps one can say that the foundation of Putin's power stability lies in two aspects. The first is the belief or illusion that Putin is capable of ensuring the improvement of the population's well-being. The second is a sense of lack of alternatives. No one but Putin! And if members of the State Duma express this with admiration, the majority of citizens accept it as a fact.
The dictatorial regime is such that it scorches the entire political field, not allowing any other political forces to participate in the political struggle. In these conditions, there are no alternative programs and goals for societal development, so most people accept it with some regret as something to endure. In such a state, one must live, raise children, and attend to one's own affairs...
"It doesn't matter anyway... Politics is a dirty business, I don't participate in it, it doesn't interest me!" This is a way of adapting to the current situation in the country, in Russia.
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