On October 23, a meeting of the EU and Central Asia Foreign Ministers took place in Luxembourg under the chairmanship of the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell.
Alongside the foreign ministers of the 27 EU member states, the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan also participated in the meeting. Among the various topics discussed at the meeting was the issue of sanctions against Russia. The final communiqué of the meeting of the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, as well as EU member states, stated that the EU had informed about eleven packages of restrictive measures it had adopted to date and emphasized the importance of results-oriented dialogue and cooperation in the context of EU sanction regimes. The EU underscored the importance of preventing sanctions evasion, and the participants agreed to continue their collaboration in this direction.
EU sanctions are dealing a heavy blow to the Russian economy and the Kremlin's ability to finance its aggression. The 11th package of sanctions against Russia adopted in June represents a new approach in the West's sanctions policy. Western countries are not just imposing new restrictions on sectors of the Russian economy but also attempting to negotiate with third countries—through them, parallel imports and simply sanctioned goods continue to flow into Russia. These third countries in the EU are promised "technical assistance" in complying with the restrictions. In case of refusal to cooperate, the EU countries promise a swift response against specific representatives of these countries.
Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, China, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have become the main sources of parallel imports into Russia. In recent months, there have been numerous publications in the media about the supply of sanctioned goods to Russia. Typically, this happens through complex chains of intermediaries in third countries—such as Turkey or Kazakhstan. According to Chinese customs data, imports of goods into Russia increased by 17.5% over the past year compared to 2021. According to the publication "Vedomosti," citing the Federal Customs Service (FTS), trade between Russia and Turkey increased by 84% last year, and by 10% with Belarus. In the first quarter of 2023, exports from Germany to Russia fell by 47%. However, it sharply increased to countries bordering Russia. For example, German exports to Kyrgyzstan jumped by about 949%, reaching 170 million euros, according to Reuters. For instance, the export of cars and spare parts increased by more than 4129% (to 84 million euros). The figures seem relatively small (for comparison: Germany's exports to the global market in March 2023 amounted to 130 billion euros), but there are other anomalies in its structure, possibly linked to subsequent deliveries to Russia. Thus, deliveries to Turkey increased by 37%, to Georgia by 92%, to Kazakhstan by 136%, to Armenia by 172%, and to Tajikistan by 154%. And since Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are part of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), goods from these countries can enter Russia without further control and customs duties. Moreover, exports from these countries to the Russian Federation are indeed growing. For example, Armenia's exports to Russia nearly tripled in 2022 to $2.4 billion. Kazakhstan increased its exports by 25% to $8.8 billion. At the same time, electronic exports increased 22-fold. Imports from Kyrgyzstan increased by 2.5 times, to almost $964 million.
For Moscow, the search for partners willing to take risks to help Russia circumvent sanctions is increasingly complicated by the threat of sanctions. This was acknowledged by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: in May, Deputy Minister Mikhail Galuzin stated that some Central Asian countries were even willing to join Western sanctions to avoid restrictions on themselves. In March, it became known that due to the growing risks of secondary sanctions against banks and companies, Turkey had closed the transit of all sanctioned goods from the EU to Russia. According to Reuters, the blocking of transit by Ankara forced Russian companies to turn to Kazakh partners. However, the Kazakh government, evaluating the risks of secondary sanctions, refused to act as an intermediary. To prevent circumvention of sanctions against Russia, Kazakhstan introduced a system for registering imported and exported products from April 1. In September, during a meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev stated that Kazakhstan would adhere to the EU sanctions regime against Russia for its aggression against Ukraine and would not allow Moscow to bypass them.
The readiness of Central Asian countries to cooperate with the EU to prevent sanctions evasion is an important positive signal, indicating a mature and responsible approach to their international obligations.
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